On the 18th the NYT published one of its mini-debates, this time on the subject “Will China Achieve Science Supremacy?” The content is right up my alley and of interest to this blog, so I’ll run through the arguments of the six contributors.

Gordon G. Chang wrote, “Hard Sciences Require  Freedom, Too.”  He asserts that China’s one-party state has already smothered creativity in the “soft sciences” (polisci, history, economics, etc.), and that its current policies will do exactly the same in the “hard sciences.”  He boils his argument down into the four following creativity-killers:  the Communist Party’s orthodoxy, Marxist instruction in schools, a flawed educational system, and internet censorship.

I just can’t say I am all that convinced.  While I certainly am no fan of the CCP’s policies in these areas, they simply don’t strike me as effectively precluding technological innovation.

As an example of how the CCP’s orthodoxy stifles genuine scientific advancement he describes the CCP’s policies re: China’s various minorities as an impediment to researchers who want to study the biological aspects of China’s ethnic or racial origins.  This has a kernel truth, but Chang also claims that “wide swaths” of biology become sensitive areas because of such policies.  While I agree that political considerations could potentially interfere with legitimate scientific inquiry, I strongly disagree with his assessment of the extent to which such control occurs.  Would such “selective blindness” in a scientific community affect certain trends in scientific research?  Yes.  Would such “selective blindness” impede innovation across the board?  I’m not so sure.  Science is a lot larger than Chang gives it credit for.

As for the Marxist instruction in schools, he claims such ideological indoctrination results in “distraction from real research and study” and “stifles free thinking across the board.”  Now perhaps I’m wearing rose-colored glasses here, but I think he greatly exaggerates the extent to which the scientific population is affected by required Marxist-Leninist classes.  This might simply be anecdotal, but the vast majority of my Chinese friends and acquaintances who went through the university system thought these classes were ridiculous, boring, and a waste of time (after class, of course, they hop onto their computer, download Prison Break, Desperate Housewives, and 24 and distract themselves from “real research and study”).  And while I don’t doubt that a percentage of the Chinese population may be negatively affected by such classes, but I do doubt that those who are so easily swayed would make for very good scientists in the first place.  I mean, how often do you hear people claim that the U.S. will never be a scientifically innovative country because of the high prevalence of childhood religious instruction, yet another form of ideological indoctrination?  I mean, at least Marxism-Leninism holds science and technology in high esteem.

The last points he makes are better, although not perfect.  China’s educational and scientific environment does have serious shortcomings, and Chinese scientists have been vocal advocates of reform.  They are keenly aware of how damaging incidences and allegations of academic or scientific misconduct are to China’s place in the international scientific community.  As for his internet freedom argument, while I am persuaded by arguments that this will hurt innovation in China’s IT sector, I am less convinced that censorship or internet policy will be as serious an impediment in other areas of science.  I’ve never seen Falungong on the front page of Nature or Science, and most scientific topics are of neutral-importance to the CCP.  Short of completely cutting off access to international sites,  I don’t think there would be a serious impediment to potential innovation.

The next essay, “A Climate for Misconduct,” by Cong Cao, is the standard “what’s wrong with the Chinese scientific establishment” article.  He highlights a number of issues.  First, he discusses how the financial and political advantages attached to greater academic credentials can leads to scientists seizing risky or unethical opportunities to get to the top.  I’ve always thought this was an interesting point, because it either means that giving scientists too much money equals bad science or counterproductive consequences, or simply that  the methods used to vet legitimate advancement are lacking.  Regarding the former, this TED talk is good food for thought, because it claims that psychological experiments have consistently shown that financial incentives for creative work actually reduce productivity.  Perhaps the fact that our scientists aren’t remunerated as well as athletes or movie stars is actually a pillar of American innovation…It is probably not far from the truth to claim that  many scientists wouldn’t do what they do were it not for their love of what they do.

Following that argument, there’s the oft-repeated “too much emphasis on quantity” of publications and the “crushing institutional pressure” placed on scientists by the government.  Cong Cao also alleges that it is nearly impossible to expose wrongful conduct among high-profile scientists, that the institutional processes that are responsible for monitoring scientific misconduct are not implemented properly (I’d like to know if he’s referring to specific institutions/regulations or if he’s speaking generally here), and that there is at least a correlative link between instances of scientific misconduct and the circumstances of China’s heavily commercialized society and corruption-heavy bureaucracy.

John Kao, in “Can Quantity Lead to Quality,” acknowledges that China can have all the patents and publications in the world, but for it to truly have “innovative science” it will need to actively link its scientific and technological abilities to “entrepreneurship, design and social innovation.”

Vivek Wadhwa, in “Many Reasons to Return,” presents some great statistics on how Chinese nationals who trained abroad and have been enticed to return to China  have fared.  Short answer–very, very well.  Great conclusion:

The bottom line is that the U.S. is providing China a huge amount of foreign aid without even realizing it. We’re exporting engines of economic growth and helping them become our long-term competitors.

Jonathan Moreno’s “The Stem Stell Example” focuses a little bit more on what the United States should do to improve its scientific prowess.  He basically says that 1) we should take advantage of our open society, which he believes translates into an ability to foster scientific exchange through personal relationships.  I’m not really sure what he’s getting at in that sentence, but he goes on to say that a better visa system would help, so I’m assuming that by “scientific exchange through personal relationships” he means bringing in top-flight foreign nationals to do science here in the States.  Then 2) we should also “invest in our patent system to ensure timely and valid awards.”  This is a great sound bite but I have no idea what this means.  Patent reform?  More money to the USPTO?  What?  If I had to guess I’d say that he probably wants to make sure that the way our patent system functions works to foster and not stifle innovation.  Easier said than done.

One odd thing he claims, which I haven’t heard of before, is that on a recent visit to China he was unable to access websites about U.S. research standards, among other innocuous topics.  I would definitely like to know what search terms he was using and what websites he tried to visit before I believe this claim.  In all my time spent lurking on the Sinophile blogosphere, I’ve never heard anything like that.

The final essay, “Strengths From the Top” by Gang Xiao, deals with the factors that will make China’s “Thousand-Person Plan” successful.  This refers to the government’s plan to recruit Chinese scientists and engineers back from abroad using fantastic incentives.  He calls out the main stumbling blocks affecting the returnees: having to deal with the close-knit hierarchy of existing research networks, circumstances in which subjective factors often trump objective evaluation of science, and the lag-time involved in attempting to get resources from local governments and institutions.  He presents the triumvirate of innovative science, the ability to “think independently, form collaboration networks without interference, and distribute and access information freely.”  One final note, he comes out with this funky sentence, “China has the ability to achieve its goals because it has often done so once it determines that these objectives are imperative to its future.”  Talk about tautology.

Most of these people also have China/Science books out, which has added almost 2000 pages to my “to-read-eventually” list…

This profile entry will be periodically updated as I come across more information.

Posts Related to this profile follow.

On China’s international competitiveness in the stem cell science:

• Regenerative Medicine Report (2010): reviewing article entitled “Cultivating regenerative medicine innovation in China.”
• New England Journal of Medicine Summary (2006): reviewing article entitled “Bit Player or Powerhouse? China and Stem-Cell Research.”

On Reported Chinese Stem Cell Breakthroughs (not verified):

• Cellonis Biotechnologies (Beijing) & Glioma (2009).
• Nanshan People’s Hospital (Shenzhen) & Spinal Cord Injury (2006)

Just doing some general research on the progress of stem cell research in China.

Here’s an old 2006 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, entitled “Bit Player or Powerhouse? China and Stem-Cell Research.”

The editorial essentially declares that China has the potential to become a stem cell powerhouse, but it simply isn’t there yet.  China is accumulating stem cell expertise, but as of yet it does not have the scientific infrastructure required for creating an environment conducive to making scientific breakthroughs in the field.

What are the main problems?

1. Funding.  They emphasized that funding of stem cell science by the government is in fact extremely limited, despite all the press.  The editorial says that the Ministry of Science and Technology funds stem cell research through two projects (basic and applied research programs), and provided ~$12 million USD to each between 2000 and 2005.  Including local government expenses, the whole figure for government funded stem cell research in China, is only ~$38 million between 2000 and 2006.  The editorial also claims that private sources of funding are “distinctly immature” in China.
2. Small talent pool.  It also gives a list of several leading stem cell researchers in China, I might look each of those up later, and says that there are between 300 and 400 Ph.D.s working on stem cells and seven “top-notch” labs associated with stem cells.  The article takes note that the pool of lower level researchers is smaller, and promising students often go abroad for advanced training.   And while China generally loses its students-cum-scientists to the United States, this trend may already be reversing.
3. Limited collaboration.  The article faults Chinese scientists for being too intensely competitive in getting their worked recognized at the international level, rather than creating informal networks of domestic cooperation.  This latter point about informal cooperative networks is one that I haven’t come across before, as most critiques of the Chinese scientific infrastructure focus on rigidity in the scientific hierarchy or the hyper-excessive focus on publication numbers.

But then China has some aces up its sleeves:

1. Cost advantage.  The editorial predicts that China should be able to maintain a cost advantage by being able to cheaply produced standardized components required for stem cell research, like laboratory animals and equipment for stem-cell manipulation.  It is also conceivable that wages could remain depressed for lower level research workers and supporting staff.  However, while the article admits that wages and material costs will rise as China develops, it also claims that more sophisticated sectors will retain a cost advantage for some time.  I’d be interested in studying why this is.
2. Attitude towards embryos.  Here the editorial seems to conflate stem cell research, generally, with the moral disputes that occur over using human embryos in stem cell research.  I wonder how many of those labs are actually doing stem cell research involving human embryonic stem cells.  Having said that, the points it brings up are true.  A very small part of the Chinese populace gets as aggravated about the use of human embryos in research as many portions of Western civil society.  The most salient government restrictions involving experimentation with embryos are concerned with implantation of an experimented upon embryo rather than what happens to the embryo itself.  All in all, the article is probably correct that there won’t be much “moral politicking” about the issue.
3. “Scientific fluidity” in translating research into medicine.  The authors emphasize that most regulation and review of clinical trials in China continues to occur within an institution, through an institution’s own Internal Review Board, and absent an external body with review powers, like the U.S. FDA’s  mechanisms.  This gives scientists considerably more leeway if the IRBs don’t function effectively.  And effectively function they definitely don’t.  A portion of my seminar paper was on this aspect of the regulation of clinical research; there are definitely serious deficiencies in the composition and functioning of IRBs, at least outside of China’s major research centers.  But as this editorial says, the likelihood that conformance with global standards could occur is pretty high, there’s a lot of pressure from government officials and scientists alike to institute internationally acceptable standards.  The problem, as it always is in China, is implementation.

I think the whole article is a pretty fair assessment of the situation three years ago.  Certainly, the government has pledged much more funding in the latest Five-Year Plan, but I don’t know how those funding goals were actually affected by the recession.  China’s talent pool will definitely grow, and we’ll see whether or not China’s innovative ability actually increases.  That is a development I will be very interested in watching.  You hear a lot about the shortcomings of China’s scientific establishment, and I think the ability or inability of China to create a homegrown industry of innovation will teach the world a lot about what is required to foster creative thinking.  And even if China conforms to global standards, the harm to “scientific fluidity” might be offset by increased foreign collaboration that such standards would encourage.